Two technologies carry the entire company
One is the structure that lets a robot physically arrive. The other is the actuation layer that lets that robot be trusted.
Technology 01 · Mobility
The sector-shaped frame — rolling and walking in one structure
While researching locomotion, we designed a sector-shaped frame to implement both walking and rolling within a single structure.
Through repeated design and driving tests, we confirmed that this structure climbs building staircases reliably without complex terrain-recognition algorithms. Geometry, not algorithms, solves the problem.
This is a physical barrier to entry that software cannot replicate. A wheeled robot cannot solve inter-floor movement without redesigning its structure.
Sector frame drawing or CAD render (4:3)
Rolls on flat ground
Rotational motion delivers 2 m/s.
Walks on stairs
Six-legged gait clears 15 or more consecutive steps.
No transformation mechanism
One structure handles both modes, so there are fewer points of failure.
Technology 02 · Trust
An actuator that does not turn without its security root
Attaching a security module to an actuator is ineffective: remove the module and the actuator still works. We took the opposite approach — verification becomes a precondition of motion.
Every motor and reducer carries physical deviations unique to that unit. We turn those deviations into a measurable signature and use it as hardware identity. What cannot be cloned is not the key — it is the unit itself.
Key derivation chain diagram (implementable as inline SVG, see the 5-step list below)
- 1
Kinematic-constant binding
Extract each unit's physical signature and fix it as hardware identity.
- 2
Key derivation chain
Derive provisioning, bus, and attestation keys from the hardware root key.
- 3
Per-command MAC
Verify an authentication tag on every control command, at roughly 20 µs of overhead.
- 4
Hardware-enforced safety limits
Torque and speed ceilings are enforced in hardware, not software.
- 5
Commutation gating
If verification fails, commutation does not occur. The robot does not move.
Goal: IEC 62443-4-2 certification at the servo-drive level
| Item | Common approach | G.NORUMI |
|---|---|---|
| Security layer | OS and network | Component / actuation |
| If the module is removed | Still operates | Does not operate |
| Basis of identity | Stored keys and certificates | Per-unit physical signature |
| Safety limits | Software-imposed | Hardware-enforced |